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#### Obama is aggressively pushing completion of a farm bill --- it’s his top priority and passage is possible

Dreiling, 11/15 (Larry, 11/15/2013, “Branches jockey for farm bill positions,” http://www.hpj.com/archives/2013/nov13/nov18/1112FarmBillLDsr.cfm))

While the House-Senate farm bill discussions continue, the White House staked out its position in an address in New Orleans. Senate Agriculture Committee Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow signaled Nov. 5 that face-to-face talks among the top four farm bill negotiators will resume this week, and she is upbeat enough to hope for a deal by Thanksgiving. “I hope so. It’s doable,” the Michigan Democrat said to the Capitol Hill publication Politico. “I feel confident the four of us can come together,” Stabenow said, speaking of herself, Sen. Thad Cochran, R-MS; Rep. Collin Peterson, D-MN; and House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas, R-OK. While the House remained on recess through Veterans Day, Peterson’s office confirmed that he was flying back to Washington early in the week, and Stabenow told Politico that all four would meet. “The savings of the farm bill will certainly be part of the solution to the budget,” said Stabenow, who is also part of those House-Senate negotiations. But she and Lucas have both said repeatedly that the text of any farm bill will be theirs to write. “The issue is who writes the farm bill,” Stabenow said. “We’ll write the farm bill.” For all her optimism, the chairwoman gave little ground herself on the contentious issue of savings on nutrition programs. The Senate farm bill proposes about $4 billion in 10-year savings, compared with the $39 billion in reductions assumed in the revised nutrition title approved by the House in September. It’s a huge gap, but Stabenow insisted that negotiators can’t ignore previously enacted food stamp cuts that went into effect Nov. 1. Those reductions will reduce spending by as much as $11 billion over the period used by the Congressional Budget Office to score the farm bill. Typically, these are not counted since the savings result from prior actions by Congress. But Stabenow said they cannot be ignored. “I am counting them,” she told Politco. “That’s real and if (the House’s) objective is to cut help for people, that started last Friday. I do count that. In fairness, that needs to be counted.” In the same vein, she showed no interest in a compromise narrowing the range of income and asset tests now used by states in judging eligibility for food stamps. “At this point, what I’m interested in doing is focusing on fraud and abuse—ways to tighten up the system to make it more accountable,” she said. “I’m not interested in taking food away from folks who have had an economic disaster, just as I’m not interested in cutting crop insurance for farmers who have had economic disasters.” Meanwhile, President Barack Obama delivered a speech at the Port of New Orleans Nov. 8, saying that passing a farm bill is the No. 1 way that Democrats and Republicans can increase jobs in the economy. Helping American businesses grow, creating more jobs—these are not Democratic or Republican priorities, Obama said. “They are priorities that everybody, regardless of party, should be able to get behind. And that’s why, in addition to working with Congress to grow our exports, I’ve put forward additional ideas where I believe Democrats and Republicans can join together to make progress right now,” Obama said. That’s when Obama launched into his pitch on the farm bill. “Congress needs to pass a farm bill that helps rural communities grow and protects vulnerable Americans,” Obama said. “For decades, Congress found a way to compromise and pass farm bills without fuss. For some reason, now Congress can’t even get that done. “Now, this is not something that just benefits farmers. Ports like this one depend on all the products coming down the Mississippi. So let’s do the right thing, pass a farm bill. We can start selling more products. That’s more business for this port. And that means more jobs right here.” Obama listed immigration reform and a responsible budget as his second and third priorities.

#### Plan is a perceived loss for Obama that saps his capital

Loomis, 7 --- Department of Government at Georgetown

(3/2/2007, Dr. Andrew J. Loomis is a Visiting Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “Leveraging legitimacy in the crafting of U.S. foreign policy,” pg 35-36, <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/7/9/4/8/pages179487/p179487-36.php>)

**In a system where a President has limited formal power, perception matters. The reputation for success**—the belief by other political actors that even when he looks down, a president will find a way to pull out a victory—**is the most valuable resource a chief executive can have**. **Conversely, the widespread belief that the Oval Office occupant is on the defensive, on the wane or without the ability to win under adversity can lead to disaster, as individual lawmakers calculate who will be on the winning side and negotiate accordingly.** In simple terms, winners win and **losers lose more often than not. Failure begets failure. In short, a president experiencing declining amounts of political capital has diminished capacity to advance his goals.** As a result, political allies perceive a decreasing benefit in publicly tying themselves to the president, and an increasing benefit in allying with rising centers of authority. A president’s incapacity and his record of success are interlocked and reinforce each other. **Incapacity leads to political failure, which reinforces perceptions of incapacity. This feedback loop accelerates decay both in leadership capacity and defection by key allies.** The central point of this review of the presidential literature is that **the sources of presidential influence—and thus their prospects for enjoying success in pursuing preferred foreign policies—go beyond the structural factors imbued by the Constitution**. Presidential authority is affected by ideational resources in the form of public perceptions of legitimacy. The public offers and rescinds its support in accordance with normative trends and historical patterns, non-material sources of power that affects the character of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic. This brief review of the literature suggests how **legitimacy norms enhance presidential influence in ways that structural powers cannot explain**. Correspondingly, **increased executive power improves the prospects for policy success**. As a variety of cases indicate—from Woodrow Wilson’s failure to generate domestic support for the League of Nations to public pressure that is changing the current course of U.S. involvement in Iraq—the effective execution of foreign policy depends on public support. Public support turns on perceptions of policy legitimacy. As a result, policymakers—starting with the president—pay close attention to the receptivity that U.S. policy has with the domestic public. In this way, normative influences infiltrate policy-making processes and affect the character of policy decisions.

#### Obama’s involvement key to broker a deal on SNAP --- it will be the last crucial item in negotiations

Hagstrom, 11/3 --- founder and executive editor of The Hagstrom Report (11/3/2013, Jerry, “Compromise Is the Key to a New Farm Bill; It is time for House and Senate conferees to stop listening to the lobbyists and finish the bill,” <http://www.nationaljournal.com/outside-influences/compromise-is-the-key-to-a-new-farm-bill-20131103>))

It was a good question because the bill's overlong development period has given all the interests so many opportunities to state their positions that they seem more dug in than in past bill-writing efforts. But at the conference last week there were signals that the conferees think the time to act has come. The 41 conferees did use the last and possibly only public opportunity to make the case for their views. But almost all the members abided by the directive from the conference leader, House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas, R-Okla., to keep their remarks to three minutes. And even the most ideological of them on the right and left were polite and stressed that they were there to compromise and finish a bill. It's unclear how quickly the conferees will proceed to the big issues because the House has left town until Nov. 12, the day after Veterans Day. There has been talk of a meeting on the bill between President Obama and the four conference committee principals—Lucas, House Agriculture ranking member Collin Peterson, D-Minn., Senate Agriculture Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow, D-Mich., and Senate Agriculture ranking member Thad Cochran, R-Miss. Peterson said he has mixed feelings about such a meeting because support from Obama might cause some House members to oppose the bill. But Peterson noted that the "one place" on which Obama could be "helpful" would be resolving the size of the cut to food stamps, formally known as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. Lucas has said that it is likely to be the last item settled and that Obama, House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, and Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., will have to make the call on that. The official White House position on food stamps is to make no cuts, while the Senate-passed farm bill would cut the program by $4 billion over 10 years and the House-passed bill would cut it by $39 billion over the same period.

#### Farm bill critical U.S. economic stability --- sustains a vital sector

Johanns, 11/12 --- Senator from Nebraska who sits on the Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry; the Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs committee (Sen. Mike Johanns, “Bill can be part of budget solution,” <http://thehill.com/homenews/news/190046-bill-can-be-part-of-budget-solution>))

But the farm bill is much more than a tool for budget hawks in Washington to achieve savings. Fresh agriculture policy has proven elusive for those who feed and fuel our world since the old policy expired last year. Recent droughts and freak blizzards underscore the need for replenished disaster assistance that expired in 2011. Farmers and ranchers from my home state of Nebraska tell me they could live without costly annual direct payments to bolster their income, and they are happy to pay into a crop insurance program that provides a backstop in tough years. They are prepared to do their part to help reduce government spending so long as they have the risk management tools they need to succeed. Lawmakers must also be prepared to provide these tools while reducing government spending. Eliminating direct payments and streamlining duplicative conservation programs are part of the agriculture titles that save about $13 billion in both chambers’ farm bills. While lawmakers might differ on how additional cost savings are achieved, the end product will reflect improved efficiency and a commitment to targeting government resources more narrowly to meet specific needs. The food stamp program is the biggest sticking point in farm bill negotiations. The Senate bill saves $4 billion from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), or about one-half of a percent. The House bill saves about 10 times more. Admittedly, there’s a lot of pasture between those two figures. And both sides should be prepared to live with something in the middle. As these negotiations move forward, we must acknowledge that we are working with a limited pot of resources, requiring a strong commitment to efficiency and priority. Nobody wants to block assistance from folks truly in need, and we should seek ways to protect limited resources for these families. One way to do this is to crack down on states that skirt eligibility requirements for SNAP recipients by enrolling folks in the program who don’t qualify for the benefit. Doing so would save roughly $20 billion and ensure limited resources are not being diluted by state programs that lure unqualified Americans into unneeded federal benefits. The farm bill is not out of the woods yet, but it stands as a model for fiscally responsible governance. The bipartisan, multiregional, multifaceted House and Senate plans focus on how to save rather than how to spend. A new long-term farm bill would provide certainty for the rural sector that is so important for economic stability. It guarantees real savings while protecting vulnerable families. And it might be just the example Congress needs to inspire responsible solutions to the fiscal challenges facing our nation.

#### Global nuclear war

Harris & Burrows 9 Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer, member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f\_0016178\_13952.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the **harmful effects on fledgling democracies** and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for** greater **conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism**’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any **economically-induced drawdown** of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, **acquire additional weapons**, and consider pursuing their own **nuclear ambitions**. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an **unintended escalation** and **broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential **nuclear rivals** combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on **preemption** rather than defense, potentially leading to **escalating crises**. 36 Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in **interstate conflicts** if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

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#### Interpretation –

#### Introduction of “United States Armed Forces” only means personnel

Eric Lorber – January 2013, EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science, JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 15:3 , https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013

As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers Resolution—especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation—are the definitions of key terms, particularly “armed forces,” as the relevant provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President “introduc[es armed forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent . . . hostilities,”172 or if such forces are introduced “into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.”173 The requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed forces “in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.”174 As is evident, the definition of “armed forces” is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over executive actions. The definition of “hostilities,” which has garnered the majority of scholarly and political attention,175 particularly in the recent Libyan conflict,176 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes important if “armed forces” exist in the situation. As is evident from a textual analysis,177 an examination of the legislative history,178 and the broad policy purposes behind the creation of the Act,179 “armed forces” refers to U.S. soldiers and members of the armed forces, not weapon systems or capabilities such as offensive cyber weapons. Section 1547 does not specifically define “armed forces,” but it states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or irregular military forces of any foreign country or government.”180 While this definition pertains to the broader phrase “introduction of armed forces,” the clear implication is that only members of the armed forces count for the purposes of the definition under the WPR. Though not dispositive, the term “member” connotes a human individual who is part of an organization.181 Thus, it appears that the term “armed forces” means human members of the United States armed forces. However, there exist two potential complications with this reading. First, the language of the statute states that “the term ‘introduction of United States Armed Forces’ includes the assignment of members of such armed forces.”182 By using inclusionary—as opposed to exclusionary— language, one might argue that the term “armed forces” could include more than members. This argument is unconvincing however, given that a core principle of statutory interpretation, expressio unius, suggests that expression of one thing (i.e., members) implies the exclusion of others (such as nonmembers constituting armed forces).183 Second, the term “member” does not explicitly reference “humans,” and so could arguably refer to individual units and beings that are part of a larger whole (e.g., wolves can be members of a pack). As a result, though a textual analysis suggests that “armed forces” refers to human members of the armed forces, such a conclusion is not determinative.

#### Violation – the Aff includes weapons systems / other non-human capabilities

#### Vote Neg –

#### Predictable limits – The United States has hundreds of different weapons systems that could be deployed by any of the 4 services across over 200 countries – These include nukes, which was its own entire topic 4 years ago

#### Ground – Deploying troops is the core question of the president’s war power because it puts troops in harm’s way – there’s no disadvantage to repositioning a forward-deployed systems

### 1NC CP

#### The executive branch of the United States should adopt a no nuclear first-use declaration.

#### Only a direct order prevents bureaucratic inertia

Smith 09 [Barron Young Smith, "These Are The President's Weapons" The New Republic, September 22, 2009 <http://www.tnr.com/print/blog/the-plank/these-are-the-presidents-weapons>]

Yet none of that obscures the importance of the fact that Obama is now acting directly to alter the U.S. nuclear posture. Unlike health care or climate change, U.S. nuclear policy is an intensely presidential issue: Throughout history, major changes to America's nuclear stance have almost always been the result of direct presidential engagement. Unless the commander-in-chief gives a direct order to alter our nuclear posture, bureaucratic inertia reigns, as it did when President Clinton's 1994 Nuclear Posture Review essentially froze the cold war status quo for another 15 years. When the president does decide to change course, however, he doesn’t have to ask anyone for permission.

### 1NC CP

#### The United States federal government should build, deploy, and offer to cooperate with Russia on long range low yield nuclear tipped interceptors as a last resort missile defense option. This system should not be designed or sized against the Russia deterrent and the United States federal government should be willing to demonstrate to Russia that this is the case. The United States Congress should prohibit the first use of nuclear forces excluding the use of long range low yield nuclear tipped interceptors as a last resort missile defense option without congressional approval.

#### CP is competitive—nuclear tipped missile defense is first use

Milne ‘2

(Tom-, Nov. 15, Pugwash Meeting Workshop Report, “No First Use of Nuclear Weapons”, #279, http://www. pugwash.org/reports/nw/milne.htm; Jacob)

Over the years the nuclear weapon states have discussed, hinted at, and planned for the first use of nuclear weapons for all manner of purposes. Some of these purposes have been bound up with the existence of other nuclear weapons: planning for a pre-emptive nuclear strike in the event that nuclear war seemed inevitable, for example, or preventive nuclear war in order to destroy an adversary's incipient or developing nuclear weapons capability. Others have not: in particular nuclear weapons have been used to offset the conventional forces of an adversary at an affordable social and economic cost, and to serve as a weapon of last resort in the face of catastrophic defeat. Use of nuclear weapons has also been threatened as a means of coercion and to deter chemical and biological weapons attack, and notions have been entertained of "demonstration" nuclear strikes as indication of a nation's seriousness of intent in a developing conflict. A somewhat different proposition has been the consideration given to the use of nuclear weapons for ballistic missile defence.

**NMD inevitable—nuclear tipped key to make it effective**

Bruno Staff Writer CFR 09

(Greg-, “National Missile Defense: A Status Report”, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/18792/>; Jacob)

The viability and cost-effectiveness of missile defense in its many forms has sparked debate for decades. In November 2008, Lt. Gen. Henry A. "Trey" Obering III, then-director of the Missile Defense Agency, told CNN that technology had caught up with ambition. "Not only can we hit a bullet with a bullet, we can hit a spot on the bullet with a bullet," the general said. The agency's current director, Lt. Gen. Patrick J. O'Reilly, has avoided such predictions and has instead highlighted the need to improve testing parameters (PDF). But critics--from analysts to lawmakers--nonetheless take collective umbrage with rosy projections put forth by missile defense supporters. John Isaacs, executive director of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, says it's a "common public relations tactic" used by the military to couch missile defense "as a monolithic whole." While some components show promise, Isaacs says, the system remains unproven. "There is no current U.S. missile defense system that can neutralize a ballistic missile threat that employs even simple decoys," he argues.

Perhaps the most often cited limitation of the antiballistic missile program involves testing scenarios that do not mimic real-world battle conditions (USA Today), a problem even Pentagon overseers acknowledge. Charles E. McQueary, director of the Defense Department's Operational Test and Evaluation command, writes in his 2008 annual assessment (PDF) of the missile agency that "additional test data collected under realistic flight test conditions is necessary to validate models and simulations and to increase confidence." Experts like Philip E. Coyle III, a senior advisor to the World Security Institute and former assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, are more blunt in their criticism. "It's embarrassing to the Missile Defense Agency and to their contractors when these tests fail, and it can also be costly," Coyle says. "Contractors can lose their award fee if a test fails and try to plan each test so it won't fail."

Paul Francis, director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office's acquisition and sourcing management division, told lawmakers in February 2009 of a different problem. Francis said that the Missile Defense Agency had begun fielding system components before being adequately tested, raising the possibility of cost overruns and making it impossible to determine the system's progress. It's a costly guessing game. Coyle says since Reagan's 1983 Star Wars speech, the United States has spent at least $120 billion to develop missile defense, although the actual figure is probably much higher. According to the Government Accountability Office, the missile agency has spent about $56 billion since 2002 and is budgeted to spend an additional $50 billion through 2013. Some congressional leaders, like Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), suggest the time has come to rein in that spending. "The Missile Defense Agency was allowed to cut corners" in the early years of the Bush administration, Levin told Bloomberg in February 2009. "I would say we've got to slow that down and properly test it."

#### Only nuclear tips can guarantee interceptors hit the missiles and aren’t confused by decoys

Costa ‘6

(Keith J.-, Jan. 5, Inside the Pentagon, “Defense Officials Nix Nuclear-Tipped Interceptor Language from RFP”, Lexis; Jacob)

Philip Coyle, the Pentagon's operational test director during the Clinton administration, said hit-to-kill technology, particularly in the presence of countermeasures, remains an issue of concern for missile defense developers.

MDA officials have looked at ways to deal with near misses of the target by a kill vehicle, he told IMD Dec. 21.

Those officials considered technology such as placing an array of "outriggers" on exoatmospheric kill vehicles. "The idea was that the outriggers would swing out from the EKV extending the reach of the EKV across a wider area of space," he said. "That way, if a conventional EKV would have missed the target by, say, a few yards, the outriggers might still hit the target."

Another option would be an "umbrella-like structure" around the EKV, the former Pentagon official said, adding, "basically, the concept is to turn near misses into hits."

But there are missile defense experts who say the only way for the ground-based missile defense system to work dependably would be to use nuclear-tipped interceptors, according to Coyle. These experts argue that "with pure hit-to-kill, and with little or no advance information about the details in such an attack, the miss distances will always be too large," he continued.

The United States briefly deployed an anti-ballistic missile system in the mid-1970s called Safeguard that used nuclear-armed interceptors.

"Trying to hit an enemy warhead out in space is like trying to hit a hole-in-one in golf, when the hole is going 15,000 miles per hour," Coyle said. "And if the enemy uses countermeasures or decoys, then it's like hitting a hole-in-one when the hole is going 15,000 [miles per hour] and the green is covered with spots that look just like the holes.

"With nuclear-tipped interceptors, the proponents would argue, all you need to do is get close to the golf course," he said.

#### Effective missile defense is key to prevent terrorism that will limit U.S. leadership and detonate WMD

Kennedy President Missile Threat ‘3

(Brian T.-, missilethreat.com a Claremont Institute National Security Project, Jan. 3, Claremont Institute, “Understanding the Need for a National Missile Defense After 9-11”, [http://missilethreat.eresources.ws/publications/ id.6/puby detail.asp](http://www.missilethreat.com/publications/id.119/pub_detail.asp); Jacob)

On September 11, our nation’s enemies attacked us using hijacked airliners. Next time, the vehicles of death and destruction might well be ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads. And let us be clear: The United States is defenseless against this mortal danger. We would today have to suffer helplessly a ballistic missile attack, just as we suffered helplessly on September 11. But the dead would number in the millions and a constitutional crisis would likely ensue, because the survivors would wonder — with good reason — if their government were capable of carrying out its primary constitutional duty: to “provide for the common defense.”

The Nature of the Threat

The attack of September 11 should not be seen as a fanatical act of individuals like Osama Bin Laden, but as a deliberate act of a consortium of nations who hope to remove the U.S. from its strategic positions in the Middle East, in Asia and the Pacific, and in Europe. It is the belief of such nations that the U.S. can be made to abandon its allies, such as Israel, if the cost of standing by them becomes too high. It is not altogether unreasonable for our enemies to act on such a belief. The failure of U.S. political leadership, over a period of two decades, to respond proportionately to terrorist attacks on Americans in Lebanon, to the first World Trade Center bombing, to the attack on the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, to the bombings of U.S. embassies abroad, and most recently to the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen, likely emboldened them. They may also have been encouraged by observing our government’s unwillingness to defend Americans against ballistic missiles. For all of the intelligence failures leading up to September 11, we know with absolute certainty that various nations are spending billions of dollars to build or acquire strategic ballistic missiles with which to attack and blackmail the United States.

Who are these enemy nations, in whose interest it is to press the U.S. into retreating from the world stage? Despite the kind words of Russian President Vladimir Putin, encouraging a “tough response” to the terrorist attack of September 11, we know that it is the Russian and Chinese governments that are supplying our enemies in Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea with the ballistic missile technology to terrorize our nation. Is it possible that Russia and China don’t understand the consequences of transferring this technology? Are Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin unaware that countries like Iran and Iraq are known sponsors of terrorism? In light of the absurdity of these questions, it is reasonable to assume that Russia and China transfer this technology as a matter of high government policy, using these rogue states as proxies to destabilize the West because they have an interest in expanding their power, and because they know that only the U.S. can stand in their way.

We should also note that ballistic missiles can be used not only to kill and destroy, but to commit geopolitical blackmail. In February of 1996, during a confrontation between mainland China and our democratic ally on Taiwan, Lt. Gen. Xiong Guang Kai, a senior Chinese official, made an implicit nuclear threat against the U.S., warning our government not to interfere because Americans “care more about Los Angeles than they do Taipei.” With a minimum of 20 Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) currently aimed at the U.S., such threats must be taken seriously.

The Strategic Terror of Ballistic Missiles

China possesses the DF-5 ballistic missile with a single, four-megaton warhead. Such a warhead could destroy an area of 87.5 square miles, or roughly all of Manhattan, with its daily population of three million people. Even more devastating is the Russian SS-18, which has a range of 7,500 miles and is capable of carrying a single, 24-megaton warhead or multiple warheads ranging from 550 to 750 kilotons.

Imagine a ballistic missile attack on New York or Los Angeles, resulting in the death of three to eight million Americans. Beyond the staggering loss of human life, this would take a devastating political and economic toll. Americans’ faith in their government — a government that allowed such an attack — would be shaken to its core. As for the economic shock, consider that damages from the September 11 attack, minor by comparison, are estimated by some economists to be nearly 1.3 trillion dollars, roughly one-fifth of GNP.

Missile defense critics insist that such an attack could never happen, based on the expectation that the U.S. would immediately strike back at whomever launched it with an equal fury. They point to the success of the Cold War theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). But even MAD is premised on the idea that the U.S. would “absorb” a nuclear strike, much like we “absorbed” the attack of September 11. Afterwards the President, or surviving political leadership, would estimate the losses and then employ our submarines, bombers, and remaining land-based ICBMs to launch a counterattack. This would fulfill the premise of MAD, but it would also almost certainly guarantee additional ballistic missile attacks from elsewhere.

Consider another scenario. What if a president, in order to avoid the complete annihilation of the nation, came to terms with our enemies? What rational leader wouldn’t consider such an option, given the unprecedented horror of the alternative? Considering how Americans value human life, would a Bill Clinton or a George Bush order the unthinkable? Would any president launch a retaliatory nuclear strike against a country, even one as small as Iraq, if it meant further massive casualties to American citizens? Should we not agree that an American president ought not to have to make such a decision? President Reagan expressed this simply when he said that it would be better to prevent a nuclear attack than to suffer one and retaliate.

Then there is the blackmail scenario. What if Osama Bin Laden were to obtain a nuclear ballistic missile from Pakistan (which, after all, helped to install the Taliban regime), place it on a ship somewhere off our coast, and demand that the U.S. not intervene in the destruction of Israel? Would we trade Los Angeles or New York for Tel Aviv or Jerusalem? Looked at this way, nuclear blackmail would be as devastating politically as nuclear war would be physically.

How to Stop Ballistic Missiles

For all the bad news about the ballistic missile threat to the U.S., there is the good news that missile defense is well within our technological capabilities. As far back as 1962, a test missile fired from the Kwajaleen Atoll was intercepted (within 500 yards) by an anti-ballistic missile launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base. The idea at the time was to use a small nuclear warhead in the upper atmosphere to destroy incoming enemy warheads. But it was deemed politically incorrect—-as it is still today—-to use a nuclear explosion to destroy a nuclear warhead, even if that warhead is racing toward an American city. So U.S. research since President Reagan reintroduced the idea of missile defense in 1983 has been aimed primarily at developing the means to destroy enemy missiles through direct impact or “hit-to-kill” methods.

#### Escalates to nuclear war

Speice, ‘6 [Patrick F. Speice, Jr., JD Candidate at The College of William and Mary, “NEGLIGENCE AND NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: ELIMINATING THE CURRENT LIABILITY BARRIER TO BILATERAL U.S.-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS,” William & Mary Law Review, February 2006, 47 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 1427]

Accordingly, there is a significant and ever-present risk that terrorists could acquire a nuclear device or fissile material from Russia as a result of the confluence of Russian economic decline and the end of stringent Soviet-era nuclear security measures. 39 Terrorist groups could acquire a nuclear weapon by a number of methods, including "steal[ing] one intact from the stockpile of a country possessing such weapons, or ... [being] sold or given one by [\*1438] such a country, or [buying or stealing] one from another subnational group that had obtained it in one of these ways." 40 Equally threatening, however, is the risk that terrorists will steal or purchase fissile material and construct a nuclear device on their own. Very little material is necessary to construct a highly destructive nuclear weapon. 41 Although nuclear devices are extraordinarily complex, the technical barriers to constructing a workable weapon are not significant. 42 Moreover, the sheer number of methods that could be used to deliver a nuclear device into the United States makes it incredibly likely that terrorists could successfully employ a nuclear weapon once it was built. 43 Accordingly, supply-side controls that are aimed at preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear material in the first place are the most effective means of countering the risk of nuclear terrorism. 44 Moreover, the end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for maintaining a large military-industrial complex in Russia, and the nuclear cities were closed. 45 This resulted in at least 35,000 nuclear scientists becoming unemployed in an economy that was collapsing. 46 Although the economy has stabilized somewhat, there [\*1439] are still at least 20,000 former scientists who are unemployed or underpaid and who are too young to retire, 47 raising the chilling prospect that these scientists will be tempted to sell their nuclear knowledge, or steal nuclear material to sell, to states or terrorist organizations with nuclear ambitions. 48 The potential consequences of the unchecked spread of nuclear knowledge and material to terrorist groups that seek to cause mass destruction in the United States are truly horrifying. A terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon would be devastating in terms of immediate human and economic losses. 49 Moreover, there would be immense political pressure in the United States to discover the perpetrators and retaliate with nuclear weapons, massively increasing the number of casualties and potentially triggering a full-scale nuclear conflict. 50

### 1NC Prolif

#### Right to enrichment in Article IV causes prolif

Dunn – Senior VP, Science Applications International Corp, served as assistant director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency – ‘9

Lewis, THE NPT Assessing the Past, Building the Future, Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 16, No. 2, July 2009

The use of the Article IV right as a cover behind which a country can pursue nuclear weapons is the most glaring weakness of the NPT. Iran **has** used **the language of** Article IV to answer criticism of its uranium enrichment activities, togain supporters among developing countries, and **to generally** make it harder to create an international consensus to block what is feared to be its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Looking ahead, **it should be expected that** other countries will use their **asserted** Article IV right to **peaceful uses to** divert international attempts to block their pursuit of nuclear weapons. This could well include those countries in the Middle East that could follow Iran in a **regional** proliferation cascade.

#### Proliferation is inevitable – the NPT makes it destabilizing – collapse causes a shift to a more effective regime

Wesley – PhD in IR , Research convenor of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University – ‘5

Michael, It's time to scrap the NPT, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:3,283 — 299

The failure of the 2005 Review of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to reach agreement on even a ‘single matter of substance’ only confirms that global efforts to control weapons of mass destruction have reached a dangerous precipice (Nason 2005; Cubby 2005). As two observers of the 2003 PrepCom (Preparatory Committee) meeting commented, ‘the NPT review process is under such severe strain that it has been sedated: interaction over difficult issues has been put on hold’ (Ogilvie-White and Simpson 2003: 48). Yet an overwhelming majority of states and commentators advocate persisting with the NPT regime, despite its numerous shortcomings. They do so in the fearful but misguided belief that it represents our ‘last chance’ (Epstein 1976) to ensure a world that is safe from the use or threat of nuclear weapons. The danger in this obsessive focus on the NPT, while failing to acknowledge and confront its fundamental weaknesses, is that states will **lose sight of** the ultimate objective – preventing the threat or **use of nuclear weapons** – and thereby gradually **lose their capacity to ensure this objectiv**e. My intention here is to provoke debate about the utility of keeping the NPT on life support, as opposed to replacing it with a regime that acknowledges contemporary realities, while developing a more effective compact against the use or threat of nuclear weapons. My central argument is that the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons will probably continue at the rate of **one or two** additional **nuclear weapons states per decade**, whether or not the NPT is retained. Persisting with the NPT will make this proliferation much more dangerous than if the NPT is replaced with a more practical regime. I argue thatthe NPT is a major cause of opaque proliferation, which is both highly destabilising and makes use of transnational smuggling networks which are much more likely than states to pass nuclear components to terrorists. On the other hand, scrapping the NPT in favour of a more realistic regime governing the possession of nuclear weapons would **help** put transnational nuclear smuggling networks out of business and stabilise the inevitable spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT was always a flawed regime, based on an unequal distribution of status and security. Its apparent effectiveness in containing nuclear proliferation was largely due to other factors**.** The events of the past 15 years have only magnified the NPT’s flaws. The end of the Cold War decoupled the possession of nuclear weapons from the global power structure. While many commentators were applauding the expansion of the number of NPT signatories, and South Africa, South Korea, Brazil and Argentina renounced plans to acquire nuclear weapons, deeper and more insistent proliferation pressures were building among the emerging great powers of Asia. The succession of Persian Gulf wars demonstrated to many insecure states that only nuclear – not chemical or biological – weapons deter conventional military attack. The international community was repeatedly surprised by the extent and sophistication of Iraq’s, Pakistan’s, North Korea’s and Libya’s progress in acquiring nuclear materials and know-how, each time underlining the inadequacies of the non-proliferation regime. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear tests, India’s highly effective rhetorical defence of its policy and the world’s half-hearted and short-lived sanctions against India and Pakistan damaged the moral authority of the NPT regime, perhaps **terminally**. Even worse than being ineffective, **the NPT is dangerous**, because it **increases the pressures for opaque proliferation and heightens nuclear instability**. Equally flawed, I argue, is the current counter-proliferation doctrine of the United States. I advocate scrapping the NPT (and the doctrine of counter-proliferation) and starting again, because the NPT is a failing regime that is consuming diplomatic resources that could be more effectively used to build an alternative arms control regime that is responsive to current circumstances. We need to confront the practicalities of scrapping the NPT -/the positives and the negatives –and think clearly about the requirements of a replacement regime.

#### Proliferation is inevitable

#### Diffusion of technology and erosion of supply-side constraints

Wesley – PhD in IR , Research convenor of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University – ‘5

Michael, It's time to scrap the NPT, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:3,283 — 299

While the demand-side pressures for proliferation will continue, the **supply side restrictions have crumbled and are unlikely to be rebuilt**. In the words of one technical expert, ‘one by one, the barriers to proliferation are gradually **falling**, and for those states that anticipate continuing security challenges, there may be a **strong temptation** during the first decades of this century **to proliferate’** (Erickson 2001: 46). On the one hand, the economic and technological barriers to acquiring nuclear components and technology are falling. Most potential nuclear weapons states are becoming wealthier at the same time as the costs of building a nuclear weapons program are falling. Globalisation has led to the broad dispersal of sophisticated project management skills, while the international education market and the fact that the basic knowledge required to make nuclear weapons is now nearly 50 years old means that **the technological competence required for a viable nuclear program is no longer a rare commodity** (Zimmerman 1994). On the other hand, the effectiveness of export controls has eroded. The post-Cold War priority of economic growth and integration led to the abolition of most blanket restrictions on dual-use technology exports and a reduction of the range of dual-use military technology subject to export controls (Saunders 2001: 127\_/8). States such as Russia and China have engaged in a form of diplomatic rent seeking by continuing to export nuclear technology and dual-use materials to potential proliferators - sometimes at the cost of substantial financial losses and threats of US sanctions (Diaconu and Maloney 2003) – in order to gain diplomatic influence and weaken US leverage over key regional states. If this combination of demand-side and supply-side conditions leads to several states’ moves towards proliferation in the years ahead, the **NPT will be singularly unable to prevent it, or to stabilise the process of proliferation**.

#### US Conventional superiority

Zachary Keck – July 3, 2013, Why Countries Build Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, The Diplomat, Associate Editor, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/07/03/why-countries-build-nuclear-weapons-in-the-21st-century/

Throughout the nuclear era, the conventional wisdom has been that one state’s nuclear acquisition has driven its adversaries to follow suit. As former Secretary of State George Shultz so eloquently put it, “proliferation begets proliferation.” Although some of the earliest nuclear proliferation cases followed this pattern, it has been increasingly rare as the taboo against the first use of nuclear weapons has become more entrenched. Instead, the primary security factor driving nuclear weapons proliferation today is the disparity in conventional military power. This is likely to continue in the future, with profound consequences for which states do and don’t seek nuclear weapons. Although conventional military power’s importance in nuclear proliferation has certainly increased in recent decades, it wasn’t completely negligible in earlier years. France’s pursuit of a nuclear weapon is a case in point. The historical narrative on France’s nuclear program has been that it was motivated by Charles De Gaulle’s intense nationalism and lack of faith in extended deterrence. The archival record does not completely support this interpretation, however. To begin with, as Jacques Hymans finds from his careful review of the historical record, it was Mendes France not De Gaulle who made the first crucial decisions to pursue the bomb. The timing of President France’s decision is telling; specifically, he ordered the initial preparations be made for building an atomic weapon three days after the Nine-Power Conference laid out the terms for West Germany’s rearmament, largely over Paris’s objections. President France’s rationale was straight forward. As Hymans explains, he believed that “French military power must remain at least one order of magnitude superior to Germany’s; thus, the fewer the restrictions on German conventional weapons, the greater the need for a French atomic force.” Given France’s suffering at the hands of the German military in WWI and WWII, his decision isn’t too hard to comprehend. Israel’s decision to pursue the bomb was also motivated almost entirely by its perceived conventional inferiority vis-à-vis its Arab neighbors. Although these neighbors did not possess nuclear weapons, Israeli leaders in the late 1950s and 1960s could not be optimistic about the military balance both then and into the future. After all, Egypt alone is 55 times larger than Israel and, in 1967, had about eleven times its population. Israeli leaders therefore calculated that acquiring a nuclear weapon was the surest way to negate this inherent conventional imbalance, and thereby ensure the Jewish state’s survival. As the nuclear taboo has become more entrenched over the decades, states have had less to fear from a neighbor acquiring an atomic weapon. Consequentially, conventional military power has surpassed nuclear arsenals in terms of its importance in driving nuclear proliferation. North Korea illustrates this nicely. Although Pyongyang began its nuclear program during the Cold War, it only started making substantial progress in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Notably, this was when the nuclear threat it faced was declining as the U.S. withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea. By contrast, it was also the time when North Korea had the most to fear from the conventional military balance on the Peninsula. Not only had it lost its great power protectorate in the Soviet Union, but South Korea’s economic ascendancy, combined with its inherent demographic advantage, meant that Pyongyang’s military position was growing precarious even if America was not part of the equation. Of course, the U.S. military is part of the equation on the Korean Peninsula, and its stunning victory in the first Gulf War left little doubt about its conventional dominance in the post-Cold War era. Subsequent years have confirmed this dominance, as well as the United States’ willingness to use it to overthrow adversarial governments. This was ominous indeed for policymakers in Pyongyang, who rightly calculated that they couldn’t match America’s conventional military might. Consequently, they sought to negate its military superiority by acquiring the ultimate deterrent. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program has followed a similar trajectory. Although the initial decision to restart the Shah’s nuclear program was motivated almost entirely by Saddam Hussein’s nuclear and chemical weapons programs, Tehran only began making real progress on the nuclear front in the middle to late 1990s. Saddam Hussein can hardly explain this trajectory, given that his threat to Iran was significantly diminished following the first Gulf War, and it was eliminated entirely after 2003. Iran’s nuclear program is better explained, then, by the rise in the potential conventional threat the U.S. poses to Iran. In the post-Cold War era, this began in full force when the U.S. decided to reactivate the 5th Fleet in July 1995, after a 45-year hiatus. Suddenly, U.S. Naval might was permanently stationed on Iranian shores. Further underscoring this danger to Iran, the following year President Bill Clinton signed the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, confirming that President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s outreach to the U.S. had failed. The U.S. threat to Iran has only grown more precarious since 2003; not surprisingly, Iran’s nuclear program has made its greatest advances during this time. The conventional military balance’s primacy in influencing horizontal nuclear proliferation is also evident from the states that have not chosen to go nuclear. For instance, no Northeast Asian country went nuclear following China or North Korea’s nuclear tests, nor did Israel’s nuclear arsenal cause a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The fact that conventional military power is the strongest factor driving nuclear proliferation should guide how we think about proliferation threats in the future. For instance, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, its neighbors will be unlikely to follow suit. Not only do these states lack the necessary technical capacity, but they have little to fear from Iran’s nearly non-existent power projection capabilities.

#### Rogue states

Pilat – Senior Advisor, LANL – ‘5

Joseph, Reassessing Security Assurances in a Unipolar World, www.twq.com/05spring/docs/05spring\_pilat.pdf

Critics fear that arguments for new weapons, including mini-nukes and bunker-busters, underscore and even increase the prestige and value of nuclear weapons and could undermine nonproliferation efforts by making nuclear weapons more attractive to potential proliferators. In essence, these critics believe that U.S. nuclear weapons are driving proliferation abroad. The relationship between U.S. nuclear weapons and U.S. nonproliferation policy, however, is not as clear and simple as critics have claimed. The notion that today’s U.S. nuclear policy has driven North Korea or Iran to develop nuclear weapons is not a legitimate one. These countries’ programs predate current U.S. policy and have advanced during a period of undeniable progress in arms reduction. In any event, **would these states really forgo the bomb if the United States disarmed**? On the other hand, if the United States were no longer able to offer nuclear assurances to its allies, what would the consequences be in key regions around the world? In contrast to the view that U.S. policy undermines nonproliferation efforts, holding states at risk of nuclear attack if they use WMD may underscore the importance of and enhance nonproliferation efforts.

#### Regional motivations

Lukyanov ‘9

(Fyodor-, July 7, Moscow Times, “Obama’s Consensus Diplomacy Put to the Test”, [http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/engsmi/ 0/1288.html](http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/engsmi/%200/1288.html); Jacob)

Disarmament experts are having a heyday because their skills are once again in demand, and the summit negotiations recall the time when disarmament issues were the focal point of U.S.-Russian relations. But this era has passed, never to return. The huge nuclear arsenals held by both countries still remain a symbol of their superpower status. It is therefore not surprising that conservatives on both sides of the ocean claimed that even the modest reductions proposed were a threat to national security. But the nuclear parity between the United States and Russia serves more of a political than a military function. Reductions in the number of weapons have more impact on national prestige than they do on national security. And because even the most diehard hawks in both countries do not consider nuclear war to be a serious possibility, negotiations over nuclear weapons have become an auxiliary tool for resolving more pressing issues. An agreement on nuclear arms reductions could kick-start stalled U.S.-Russian cooperation on a number of other nonrelated issues. At least, that is what Moscow hopes. Obama is hoping that reductions in nuclear arsenals will give a big boost to his larger goal of global nuclear disarmament. But chances are slim that either side’s hopes will be realized. An agreement would, of course, improve the overall climate, but that success probably would not extend to other areas. As for those countries that have already obtained nuclear weapons “illegally” or are striving to do so, they do not see any link between their own situations and the actions of the United States and Russia. As a rule, Iran, North Korea, Israel, India and Pakistan all want “the bomb” to control regional conflicts. Only a resolution of those conflicts would convince them to give up their nuclear ambitions, not the example set by Moscow and Washington. U.S. advocates of an ideology-based foreign policy — from neoconservatives to liberal interventionists — accuse Obama of betraying certain ideals. They believe that he should dictate terms to Moscow, laying out how it must change if it wants to be a partner with Washington. The demands of the “moralists” reflect a long and extensive tradition in U.S. political thought, but they are at odds with the prevailing reality. In the 21st century, ideology will not be the driving force behind world politics. Ideology had its hour of triumph in the last century, but that time has passed. Of course, a classic rivalry between the world’s largest powers dominated the 20th century. But from the moment World War I ended until the collapse of the Soviet Union, ideology determined not only the form, but also the substance of that rivalry to a large degree. In addition to the 20th-century’s two totalitarian ideologies of communism and Nazism, liberal ideology also played a key role. Former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s model of internationalism was the first to promote that liberal ideology in the world arena, and after various advances and setbacks, it reemerged toward the end of the 20th century under the watchword of a “new world order.” Former U.S. President George W. Bush’s attempts at “promoting democracy” proved to be both the culmination and the undoing of the liberal ideology. The conviction that the imbalance in the global system could be restored by forcefully imposing social and political structures on “problem countries” led U.S. foreign policy into a dead end. The much talked-about multipolar composition of today’s world is not an abstract model proposed by Washington’s rivals and detractors in Moscow and Paris. A significant number of players of varying caliber and quality have appeared on the global stage, each influencing the course of events in different ways. Compared to the Cold War era, when the standoff between the two superpowers gave them complete dominance in international affairs, the influence of the remaining players is now much greater than before. What’s more, the United States does not have the power to make them toe the official Washington line. Obama’s new approach — the willingness to take others’ views into account, reliance on international institutions and “consensus diplomacy” — does not yet constitute a new foreign policy, but is merely a wish list. Nobody knows whether those methods will work, just as it remains unclear whether the economic measures taken by his administration will produce the desired effect. The main geopolitical tools of the 20th century — nuclear weapons and ideology — are losing their former value. The new priority is to maintain a complex balance between multiple states. But it is first necessary to understand the interests that drive numerous regional conflicts. Solving those conflicts would represent a greater success than formulating approaches to resolving global issues. That is why the main result of Obama’s Moscow visit was the agreemnt on the transportation of U.S. military freight to Afghanistan through Russian airspace.

#### The aff can’t contain it – empirics prove—Declaratory policy doesn’t change other countries’ nuclear decisions

Martin et al – Policy Analysis Program Officer, Stanley Foundation – ‘9

Matt, A New Look at No First Use, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=334

Some participants were not sure that NFU would measurably reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. For example, nuclear weapons certainly affect the relationship between India and Pakistan, and their nuclear weapons are not even deployed. Moreover, when Russia and India declared that they would no longer adhere to a NFU posture, the effect—negative or positive—on the international community was negligible. One participant recalled a meeting in Norway on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons, in which the representatives of Asian countries were unenthusiastic about NFU. Instead, **they said the key to delegitimizing nuclear weapons was to get them out of the hands of the military and remove them from war plans**. To that end, **rather than changing declared doctrine, the United States should focus on programmatic steps toward a less aggressive nuclear posture—cutting the Reliable Replacement Warhead, de-alerting nuclear weapons, developing conventional means to cover every possible contingency except for nuclear attac**k, and so forth. The United States should strive to emphasize, with words and actions, that “the purpose of nuclear weapons is to ensure that they are never used.” Participants said that such a policy would have the virtue of reducing the salience of nuclear weapons while remaining more realistic and honest about possible nuclear use in extenuating circumstances.

### 1NC China

#### Tons of alt causes to Chinese modernization

#### Existing missile defense, regional insecurity, space weapons

Yuan – 2009, Director, East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Associate Professor of international policy studies, the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Jing-dong, China and the Nuclear-Free World, April

Finally, U.S. missile defense deployments in East Asia pose a serious threat to China’s second-strike nuclear capabilities. Given the size and sophistication of China’s small nuclear arsenal, the ability to survive a fi rst strike is critical to maintaining the credibility and reliability of its deterrence.42 Despite Washington’s assurance that it seeks only a limited missile defense not directed at China, Beijing continues to seek—and this may well explain its current nuclear modernization eff orts—to reverse the growing imbalance as a result of U.S. missile defense plans,43 not to mention the new nuclear security environment that China has to face, namely, the emergence of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states and North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. The U.S. dependence on space assets for military operations—along with the fact that Beijing sees U.S. missile defense systems as a precursor to weaponization of outer space—may also explain China’s eff orts to develop a limited antisatellite capability.44 Chinese concerns extend beyond missile defenses; U.S. capabilities in long-range precision conventional strike weapons, combined with C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), further deepen China’s sense of vulnerability. If these trends continue, it could lead China to take action to redress an emerging nuclear imbalance. Given its relatively smaller and less sophisticated arsenal, there is good reason Beijing would be reluctant to endorse measures that could impose signifi cant constraints on its ability for self-defense. China’s nuclear modernization eff orts in recent years—with an emphasis on qualitative rather than quantitative improvements, especially in areas such as enhanced mobility, survivability, and, hence, credibility of its deterrence—are indicative of Beijing’s serious concerns.45

#### US capabilities – not declaratory policy

Bloomberg - Jun 3, 2013, China Nuclear Stockpile Grows as India Matches Pakistan Rise, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/china-nuclear-weapons-stock-grows-as-india-matches-pakistan-rise.html

China, which has the world’s second-largest military budget behind the U.S., expanded its nuclear-weapons arsenal last year, with India and Pakistan also bolstering their stockpiles, a research institute said. The three added an estimated 10 warheads each to their inventories, with China’s arsenal now reaching 250 devices, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute said today in releasing a new yearbook. Pakistan holds 100 to 120 units and India 90 to 110, while North Korea may have as many as eight warheads with an uncertain operational status, it said. As efforts have intensified among nuclear states to curb the proliferation of the weapons, the international focus has shifted to stopping Iran from joining the ranks. At the same time the U.S. and others are working to update even if not expand their warheads and the ability to deliver them. “The long-term modernization programs underway in these states suggest that nuclear weapons are still a marker of international status and power,” said Shannon Kile, a senior researcher at the organization. “All are making qualitative improvements.” In Iran, which the U.S. and European countries are trying to block from gaining such weapons, “we are seeing a steady expansion in the scope and also the pace of its nuclear program,” Kile said. Shrinking Arsenal The global nuclear weapon arsenals shrank to about 17,265 warheads at the start of the year from 19,000 a year earlier as the U.S. and Russia continue eliminating them under bilateral arms control agreements, Sipri said. Russia retains the largest inventory, with 8,500 warheads, ahead of 7,700 held by the U.S. Russia and the U.S. have embarked on large renewal programs, Kile said. Both countries have committed to developing new long-range bombers to replace aging aircraft. “Russia is moving to a smaller force, but a more capable force,” Kile said. The U.S., with the world’s largest defense budget, is set to spend $214 billion in the next decade on related activities, he said. “The irony is that with President Obama’s Prague address in 2009 calling for the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons, in fact the U.S. is determined to retain its triad of nuclear forces for the indefinite future,” Kile said in reference to the mix of long-range bombers, missiles, and submarine-launched capabilities the Pentagon maintains. French Nukes China, too, is pursuing a “qualitative” improvement of its inventory, Kile said. U.S. spending, including on long-range conventional strike capabilities, is driving China to make its own missiles more mobile and harder to attack, he said. “We have always kept our nuclear capability at the lowest level commensurate with the need for national security,” China Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said at a briefing in Beijing today. “China hopes the outside world does not make groundless speculation about China’s limited nuclear capability.” India is similarly working on expanding its capabilities to use nuclear weapons through new ballistic missiles in development. “With India we see the gradual expansion of its longer-range ballistic missile capabilities which are not really targeted at Pakistan but rather at China,” Kile said. The French nuclear warhead inventory, the world’s third largest, remained unchanged at 300 units with the U.K. also maintaining a level stockpile at 225 devices. Israel, which has never publicly acknowledged its stockpile, is estimated to remain at 80 warheads, Sipri said. “There was an extraordinary number of tests of nuclear-capable launch systems conducted in 2012,” Kile said. “That really is a good indicator of the commitment of all of these countries to modernize or expand their arsenals.”

#### Desire for parity

JON HARPER - October 03, 2013, ANALYSIS: China's nuke buildup is a concern, but a nuclear-armed Japan is not the answer, The Asahi Shimbun, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201310030013

And according to the U.S. Defense Department, China is also developing and deploying new types of nuclear platforms, including road-mobile missile launchers and possibly "MIRV" technology that will enable China to put many nuclear warheads on a single missile. In 2012, the Chinese tested a new JL-2 ballistic missile that could be placed on submarines as early as this year--a step that will give the Chinese navy its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent. The Chinese leaders’ motivation for these actions is more important than the actions themselves. So why is Beijing pushing nuclear modernization at a time when the United States and Russia are significantly reducing their respective arsenals? One possible explanation is that China wants to be seen as a superpower, and achieving closer nuclear parity with the United States would help it reach that goal. Chinese leaders may believe that being in the same atomic league as America will facilitate their efforts to establish the “new type of great power relations” that they are seeking. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Non-Proliferation Program at the Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, believes there’s some validity to that argument. “I don’t think that there’s any evidence that they’re tremendously interested in (numerical) parity as a goal,” he told The Asahi Shimbun. “(But) if you think about the increasingly implausible argument for why the Communist Party should run China, you know, it has a lot to do with making China a strong and prosperous country. … I think there is a general tendency on the part of the Chinese leadership to seek the same advanced military capabilities that other big powers have.”

#### Conventional modernization causes the impact

JON HARPER - October 03, 2013, ANALYSIS: China's nuke buildup is a concern, but a nuclear-armed Japan is not the answer, The Asahi Shimbun, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/views/opinion/AJ201310030013

As China grows increasingly assertive on the world stage, the country is also aggressively expanding its nuclear forces. But this disturbing trend is being overshadowed by other issues. Most officials, analysts and media in the United States and its allies are focused on the Chinese military’s growing arsenal of sophisticated conventional weapons, such as stealth fighters, aircraft carriers, submarines, anti-ship missiles, anti-satellite missiles and cyber-attack capabilities. A recent report by the U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center tells us: “China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world. It is developing and testing offensive missiles, forming additional missile units, qualitatively upgrading missile systems, and developing methods to counter ballistic missile defenses.”

#### US nuclear posture doesn’t cause arms racing with Russia or China

Blair 06 (Bruce G. Blair, President of the World Security Institute, with Chen Yali, The Fallacy of Nuclear Primacy, China Security, Autumn 06, http://www.wsichina.org/cs4\_4.pdf)

The professors’ predictions and hypotheses about the adverse implications of nuclear primacy in the future – fraying of nuclear relations, re-kindling of a nuclear arms race, heightened instability during a crisis, and increased risk of nuclear war – lend themselves to testing in the crucible of history. What actually happened after Russia’s strategic collapse over a decade ago? Nothing remotely reminiscent of the theoretically predicted upheaval. Contrary to the professors’ expectations, deterrence did not unravel; the imbalance did not lead to growing nuclear tensions or to a nuclear arms race and did not induce Russia or China to take destabilizing steps. The United States did not contemplate a preventive nuclear strike against Russia or China, nor did Russia or China become more poised than before to preempt in a crisis with America. All sides all but ignored the theoretical first strike capability of the United States during the past 15 years (and much longer in the case of China). This history is not a perfect crucible for testing all of the professors’ hypotheses, but the preponderance of evidence so far refutes their argument. What this recent history really seems to be suggesting is that U.S. nuclear primacy is an academic artifice that was and is practically useless for understanding America’s relations with other nuclear powers. Nuclear primacy in modern times offers no exploitable political leverage. Russia and China appear quite confident in their deterrent arsenals in spite of the lopsided U.S. advantage estimated by models of nuclear war.

#### No SCS war

Ba, Professor IR Delaware, ’11 (Alice, December, “Staking Claims and Making Waves in the South China Sea: How Troubled Are the Waters?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, Vol 33 No 3, Project Muse)

Conclusion To varying degrees, authors in this issue generally agree that conflict can be avoided and that there are spaces for potential compromise. Fravel, for example, cites historical precedents where China has been willing to make territorial compromises in support of larger strategic and political objectives; he also sees opportunities in China’s exclusion of the Spratlys from its drawing of its baselines.52 Goldstein draws attention to the concern for moderation and compromise from China’s senior leadership, as well as key naval higher-ups; Thayer highlights the mechanisms and interests that exist to counter more emotional and violent reactions. Womack, along with Fravel and Thayer, sees China and ASEAN states’ 2011 agreement and attention to implementing the DoC as a significant recognition by states of the need to reduce tensions, especially as it involved critical and symbolic concessions, especially on the parts of China and Vietnam. Much like the original DoC, the 2011 agreement and [End Page 285] states’ ability to overcome their stalemate expressed a common interest to ratchet down the dispute from where it was in 2009 and 2010. While acknowledging the need for “bolder” measures, Womack sees the DoC as both “reasonable” and “promising” as a framework that moreover can provide the basis for “a more robust Spratly Management Authority”. Most of all, authors mostly see the prospects for major conflict being mitigated by an unfavourable cost-benefit calculus where the costs of conflict and militarization will be high and the benefits far from clear. Certainly, this is true of Southeast Asia’s weaker states, but it is also true of the major powers — China and the United States. For China, for example, Womack is strongest in seeing militarization of the dispute as contrary to China’s “quarter century of broad and peaceful development” and reform-era policies and diplomacy that have served it very well. A South China Sea conflict scenario would also likely have ripple effects along China’s periphery among other neighbouring and lesser states that are most vulnerable to Chinese power. Given the attention and priority that has been given to stabilizing China’s periphery these past two decades, it hardly seems in China’s interest to militarize the South China Sea in such a way that invites more active interventions from others in the seas around it, especially given its own reliance on those waters to get goods in and out. At minimum, militarization would divert resources and attention from both domestic and other global objectives, with active defence of claims requiring “diplomatic and military efforts of the utmost magnitude”.53 Womack is blunt in his argument that the Spratlys, in the larger scheme of Chinese objectives, is insignificant: “[T]here is no threshold of military superiority that would make it beneficial for China to establish its control over all the Spratlys at the cost of strategic hostility with Southeast Asia.” By one argument, China has the most to lose with the militarization of the South China Sea dispute. As for the United States, Goldstein is most direct in considering the risks and costs of US involvement. Much as is the case in his discussion on US assessments of China, Goldstein’s concern is that too much is assumed of US power and attraction, and too much weight has already been placed on a dispute that is not that important to US larger interests or global balance of power. As already noted, Washington’s diplomatic intervention has already been at cost to US-China relations in other areas. US-China tensions also [End Page 286] potentially push away Southeast Asian states who fear great power conflict more than they want the US to balance China.54 Most of all, Goldstein warns the United States against “competing for the sake of competing” and to guard against over-involving itself in a conflict that risks US credibility, if not lives (as it did forty years ago in Vietnam).

#### NFU won’t be credible for India – army goes rogue and targets other countries nukes

Nurang 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(Vipin, “Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture” Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2013, http://web.mit.edu/polisci/news/pdf/NarangFiveMyths.pdf)

The second reason why India’s NFU pledge is a myth, however, is more complicated and indirect. It centers on an issue explicated by Professor Barry Posen at the end of the Cold War: inadvertent escalation, or targeting nuclear systems with conventional forces which could result in a nuclear detonation.30 In discussions with retired Indian Army and Air Force officers, it has become clear that in a conventional conflict with Pakistan or China, India’s conventional operators consider any fixed nuclear target or any mobile missile launcher, in the field or on a base, as legitimate targets which they could strike without prior political clearance. In both cases, India’s Air Force or Army may not be able to, or may not care to, determine whether the systems they are targeting are nuclear or conventional. Indeed, some have gone so far as to say that they intend to degrade the adversary’s nuclear systems at the outset of a conventional conflict, and that this strategy would not otherwise require political authorization, despite the enormous strategic consequences. This not only puts India’s adversaries, particularly Pakistan, in a potentially use-/it-/or-/lose-/it situation, but could possibly cause a nuclear detonation, since no one can say with certainty whether Pakistani designs could tolerate a conventional blast without triggering a yield event. This is extremely dangerous, and could put India in a position where it is responsible/albeit through the application of conventional power/for the first use of a nuclear weapon on an adversary’s territory

#### Indian nuclear development isn’t political – driven by scientists means they can’t solve

Nurang 13, Assistant Professor of Political Science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

(Vipin, “Five Myths about India’s Nuclear Posture” Center for Strategic and International Studies, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2013, http://web.mit.edu/polisci/news/pdf/NarangFiveMyths.pdf)

Outsiders could fairly assume that, given the stakes for Indian national security, the evolution of India’s nuclear posture/development of lower-/order use options, MIRVs, BMD, the dilution of India’s NFU pledge, and the movement to higher readiness systems/is lucidly driven by a centralized political strategy. Whatever bureaucratic and service interests that drove past Indian nuclear policy, surely the rise of a stronger civilian national security body and the creation of the SFC (after India’s 1998 nuclear tests and the 1999 Kargil War with Pakistan) have resulted in stronger centralized direction in India’s nuclear posture. Surely there is now centralized and consistent political guidance on the crucial questions of what India is seeking to deter and which nuclear forces are required to do so. Right? Nothing could be farther from the truth. The evolution of India’s posture down this potentially dangerous path is still driven almost entirely by technical bureaucracies and scientists. The civilian political leadership, particularly the Prime Minister’s Office, has exercised far too little discipline over these bodies. Many scholars have identified this longstanding problem over the years, most notably Perkovich, Sagan, and Tellis. But the stakes have become even higher. Especially now, India can ill-/afford to allow its own bureaucracies to drag it into a very dangerous arms race against China and Pakistan. DRDO, in particular, is driving India’s posture without a steering wheel: it continues to advertise the development of capabilities for which it concedes there has been no political clearance. Clearly, India’s scientists have their own organizational and prestige incentives to develop what they continually tout as ‘‘world class capabilities.’’31 But in this case, flaunting these projects when they do not yet have political clearance or when the capability is immature is risky. In February 2013, for example, DRDO publicized the development of the Agni VI, an ICBM that would be MIRV’d with ‘‘four or six warheads depending on their weight,’’ but crucially admitted that ‘‘the Union government is yet to sanction [the] Agni-/VI project.’’32 In other words, India’s missileers are developing a multiple-/warhead intercontinental capability without clearance from civilian authorities/a remarkable fact in a supposedly mature and modern nuclear state. Either DRDO is exceeding its brief or India’s domestic organs are playing a risky good-/cop/bad-/cop routine that imperils global security.

# 2NC

## CP

### AT: Congressional Consultation Solves

#### Missile defense requires quick response

GAO 11

(July, Ballistic Missile Defense)

DOD concurred with our recommendation that DOD issue guidance that designates an entity to be responsible for integrating training across and among combatant commands and elements and provide that entity with the authority to develop an overall ballistic missile defense training strategy. The department further stated that Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and U.S. Strategic Command, with the assistance of the Joint Staff will provide the policy and required advocacy for the development of an integrated training strategy for ballistic missile defense. Although DOD concurred with this recommendation and state its intention to issue policy for developing an integrating training strategy, the department did not state when it intended to do so. Since defending againt ballistic missile attacks requires a quick response, it is important that DOD develops an integrating training strategy to connect seams where commands, tiers, or elements must work together. Therefore, we believe that DOD should issue this policy as soon as possible.

#### Speed of nuclear attack means no time to consult Congress

Torricelli 87

(Robert G., U.S. Senator, Rutgers Law, MA from Harvard, “The War Powers Resolution after the Libya Crisis”, 4-1-1987, Pace Law Review Volume 7, http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss3/5)

Already, Congress' ability to exercise a direct influence on foreign and defense policy has been weakened by the march of technology. When faced with an imminent nuclear attack, a President would have no time to consult with Congress even if¶ he so desired. Congressional control of the budget is frequently¶ cited by the executive branch as evidence of Congress' influence¶ over military matters. Congressional power of the purse, however, influences long-term policy only, not decisions that have to be made quickly. The political reality of Washington is that Congress, for the¶ most part, prefers a President to take the lead on foreign policy. So long as it agrees with presidential policy, Congress is unlikely¶ to step in, even when it is not consulted. Congress tends to fence¶ in a President only when it disagrees with both the substance¶ and method of presidential conduct.

### 2NC Solvency

#### Nuclear interceptors key to effective missile defense – doesn’t undermine solvency

Bergner 13, Recent graduate of Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program

(Jonathan, Should the United States Reconsider Nuclear-Tipped Interceptors for Ballistic Missile Defense?, csis.org/files/publication/130214\_Spies\_NuclearNotes2.2\_Web.pdf)

Instead, U.S. national missile defense programs over the last two decades have focused on “hit-to-kill” interceptors. These interceptors are tipped with kill vehicles that rely on the kinetic energy generated by a high-speed collision with an incoming warhead to destroy it. This system requires an exceptional level of accuracy for success. Although technology has continued to improve and much higher levels of interceptor accuracy are indeed now possible, questions remain over whether such systems are reliable and cost-effective. And yet the Obama administration’s number-one policy priority in the February 2010 “Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report” was to “continue to defend the homeland from the threat of limited ballistic missile attack.” If the United States is serious about this goal, it may be time to reevaluate the use of nuclear-tipped interceptors for its ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. It is clear that there are some significant challenges in making the U.S. ICBM defense shield nuclear. Indeed, the Obama administration has stated that it is also seeking to “reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in the future.”3 However, the use of nuclear weapons in this nonoffensive capacity is a different discussion than the usual ones of nuclear drawdowns and arms control. The debate should be over whether, of all the feasible options, the nuclear destruction of incoming warheads provides the best, most reliable defense against a limited missile attack. If this assertion is correct—as the Russians have believed for decades—serious analysis of what such a system would look like and how the United States could take steps to address the remaining challenges is necessary. One possibility might be to consider how to replace the kinetic kill vehicles on the interceptors currently deployed for the ground-based, midcourse defense system with low-yield, nuclear kill vehicles.

### NMD Deployment Now

#### Obama fully deploying conventional NMD in the squo

Auslin 13, Resident Scholar at AEI

(Michael, Now We Know Why Obama Reversed Course on Missile Defense, www.nationalreview.com/corner/345408/now-we-know-why-obama-reversed-course-missile-defense-michael-auslin

Last month, the Obama administration abruptly backtracked on cutting continental missile defense, and decided to restore the full amount of interceptors in Alaska to an original Bush administration plan. Given the time and cost of the reversal (costing up to $200 million and taking at least two years), many wondered what could have spooked an administration not known for second-guessing itself. Well, this report may reveal the answer: Part of the U.S. intelligence community now believes North Korea has achieved at least a rudimentary capability to put nuclear weapons on long-range ballistic missiles. That, of course, is a game-changer, even if the North can’t yet depend on the accuracy of its missiles (or weapons, for that matter).

#### US expanding conventional NMD Now

WSJ 13

(3/19, Obama's Missile-Defense Reversal, online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323415304578366370800326406)

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel chose Friday afternoon to announce one of the biggest switcheroos of the Obama Presidency: The Pentagon now plans to fortify America's homeland defenses against missile attack, reversing a 2009 decision that was part of President Obama's fantasy of a world without nuclear weapons. Mr. Hagel said the U.S. will add 14 ground-based long-range missile interceptors by 2017 to the 30 already deployed at sites in Alaska and California. "The United States has missile-defense systems in place to protect us from limited ICBM attacks," said the new Defense chief, "but North Korea in particular has recently made advances in its capabilities and is engaged in a series of irresponsible and reckless provocations."

### Impact

#### Extinction

#### Ochs, has published articles in the Baltimore Sun, Baltimore Chronicle, Science magazine and the website: www.freefromterror.net, past president of the Aberdeen Proving Ground Superfund Citizens Coalition, member of the Depleted Uranium Task force of the Military Toxics Project and a member of the Chemical Weapons Working Group, 6-9-2K2 (Richard, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html)

Of all the weapons of mass destruction, the genetically engineered biological weapons, many without a known cure or vaccine, are an extreme danger to the continued survival of life on earth . Any perceived military value or deterrence pales in comparison to the great risk these weapons pose just sitting in vials in laboratories. While a "nuclear winter," resulting from a massive exchange of nuclear weapons, could also kill off most of life on earth and severely compromise the health of future generations, they are easier to control . Biological weapons, on the other hand , can get out of control very easily, as the recent anthrax attacks has demonstrated. There is no way to guarantee the security of these doomsday weapons because very tiny amounts can be stolen or accidentally released and then grow or be grown to horrendous proportions. The Black Death of the Middle Ages would be small in comparison to the potential damage bioweapons could cause. Abolition of chemical weapons is less of a priority because, while they can also kill millions of people outright, their persistence in the environment would be less than nuclear or biological agents or more localized. Hence, chemical weapons would have a lesser effect on future generations of innocent people and the natural environment. Like the Holocaust, once a localized chemical extermination is over, it is over. With nuclear and biological weapons, the killing will probably never end. Radioactive elements last tens of thousands of years and will keep causing cancers virtually forever .Potentially worse than that, bio-engineered agents by the hundreds with no known cure could wreck even greater calamity on the human race than could persistent radiation. AIDS and ebola viruses are just a small example of recently emerging plagues with no known cure or vaccine. Can we imagine hundreds of such plagues? HUMAN EXTINCTION IS NOW POSSIBLE. Ironically, the Bush administration has just changed the U.S. nuclear doctrine to allow nuclear retaliation against threats upon allies by conventional weapons. The past doctrine allowed such use only as a last resort when our nation's survival was at stake. Will the new policy also allow easier use of US bioweapons? How slippery is this slope? Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity's survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope. " No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes.

Accidents impact

Buffalo News 00

(7/16)

Nonetheless, it does not follow that we should permanently give up the idea of defending against weapons of mass destruction. Rational governments will always be deterred from starting a nuclear war, but by definition, you can't deter accidents, unauthorized actions, miscalculations or madmen. And as long as defenses are banned, all states will be completely vulnerable to that kind of attack.

There is an obvious solution to this apparent dilemma: Defenses can be deployed only on a cooperative, negotiated, multilateral basis. Put differently, the paradox of defense in the nuclear age is that you can defend yourself only if your opponent agrees to let you do so.

NMD is key to devalues WMD and reduce missile proliferation

Kennedy ‘1

(Brian T.-, July 23, “America is Worth Defending”, Online; Jacob)

I look forward to seeing the final marks for the defense authorization bill, and in particular, the language associated with the European Site. There is so much at stake here. As I have said before, missile defense is not only our last line of defense for an incoming ballistic missile, it is also our first line of defense to counter missile proliferation because it devalues these weapons as offensive military assets, which may ultimately keep nuclear technology in general out of the hands of terrorist-friendly nations. It is my hope Ms. Tauscher both substantiates her claims to support this critical defense initiative, and helps to lead our colleagues during conference to support our allies in Poland and the Czech Republic.

## Prolif adv

### Opaque Prolif 2NC

#### Opaque proliferation causes miscalculation, accidents and loose nukes

Wesley – PhD in IR , Research convenor of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University – ‘5

Michael, It's time to scrap the NPT, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:3,283 — 299

By prohibiting proliferation, without the capacity or moral authority to enforce such a prohibition, the NPT makes opaque proliferation the only option for aspiring nuclear weapons states.4 **Opaque proliferation is destabilising to regional security. It breeds miscalculation** – both overestimation of a state’s nuclear weapons development (as shown by the case of Iraq), and underestimation (in the case of Libya) – that can force neighbouring states into potentially catastrophic moves. Even more dangerous, argues Lewis Dunn, is the likelihood that states with covert nuclear weapons programs will develop **weak failsafe mechanisms and nuclear doctrine** that is **destabilising**: In camera decision making may result in uncontrolled programs, **less attention to safety and control problems and only limited assessment of the risks of nuclear weapon deployments or use**. **The necessary exercises cannot be conducted, nor can procedures for handling nuclear warheads be practised, nor alert procedures tested**. As a result, the **risk of accidents or incidents may rise greatly**

in the event of deployment in a crisis or a conventional conflict. **Miscalculations** by neighbours or outsiders also **appear more likely**, given their uncertainties about the adversary’s capabilities, as well as their lack of information to judge whether crisis deployments mean that war is imminent (1991: 20, italics in original). And because both the NPT and the current US counter-proliferation doctrine place such emphasis on preventing and reversing the spread of nuclear weapons, states such as Pakistan, which desperately need assistance with both failsafe technology and stabilising nuclear doctrine, have been suspicious of US offers of assistance (Pregenzer 2003). As the dramatic revelations of the nature and extent of the A. Q. Khan network showed, some states undertaking opaque proliferation have been prepared to rely on transnational smuggling networks to gain vital components, materials and knowledge. Quite apart from the incapacity of the NPT regime to deal with this new form of proliferation (Clary 2004), such non-state networks raise very real risks that for the right price, criminals or other facilitators could pass nuclear materials to terrorist groups or extortionists (Albright and Hinderstein 2005). Both through **its inadequacies and its obsessive focus on stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT could be contributing to the ultimate nightmare: terrorists armed with nuclear or radiological weapons**.

# 1NR

## T

### 2NC AT We Meet

#### The soldier who presses the button to launch the nuke isn’t in hostilities --- NDAA proves

Healey & Wilson 13 – Jason Healey is the director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council. AND\*\*\* A.J. Wilson is a visiting fellow at the

Atlantic Council, 2013, “Cyber Conflict and the War Powers

Resolution: Congressional Oversight

of Hostilities in the Fifth Domain,” jnslp.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/11\_Dycus.pdf‎

War Powers and Offensive Cyber Operations¶ In a report submitted to Congress in November 2011, pursuant to a mandate in section 934 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2011, the Pentagon, quoting the WPR’s operative language, stated that:8 **Cyber operations might not include the introduction of armed forces personnel into the area of hostilities.** Cyber operations may, however, be a component of larger operations that could trigger notification and reporting in accordance with the War Powers Resolution. The Department will continue to assess each of its actions in cyberspace to determine when the requirements of the War Powers Resolution may apply to those actions. With the focus on “personnel,” this passage makes clear that the WPR will typically not apply to exclusively cyber conflicts. With cyber warriors executing such operations from centers inside the United States, such as the CYBERCOM facility at Fort Meade, Maryland, at a significant distance from the systems they are attacking and well out of harm’s way. Thus, there is no relevant “introduction” of armed forces. Without such an “introduction,” even the reporting requirements are not triggered. ¶ The view that there can be no introduction of forces into cyberspace **follows naturally from the administration’s argument that the purpose of the WPR is simply to keep US service personnel out of harm’s way** unless authorized by Congress. If devastating unmanned missions do not fall under the scope of the resolution, it is reasonable to argue that a conflict conducted in cyberspace does not either.¶ Arguing the point, an administration lawyer might ask, rhetorically, what exactly do cyber operations “introduce”? On a literal, physical level, electrical currents are redirected; but nothing is physically added to—nor, for that matter, taken away from—the hostile system. To detect any “introduction” at all, we must descend into metaphor; and even there, all that is really introduced is lines of code, packets of data: in other words, information. At most, this information constitutes the cyber equivalent of a weapon. “Armed forces,” by contrast, consist traditionally of weapons plus the flesh and blood personnel who wield them. And that brings us back to our cyber-soldier who, without leaving leafy Maryland, can choreograph electrons in Chongqing. Finally, even if armed forces are being introduced, there are no relevant “hostilities” for the same reason: no boots on the ground, no active exchanges of fire, and no body bags.

### AT: USAF

#### USAF = regular components of DOD

Farlex 13 The Free Dictionary By Farlex, “United States Armed Forces,” Accessed 7-23, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United+States+Armed+Forces

Used to denote collectively only the regular components of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. See also Armed Forces of the United States.

#### US Code excludes weapons from the air force

US Code No Date – "10 USC § 8062 - Policy; composition; aircraft authorization" www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/8062

(a) It is the intent of Congress to provide an Air Force that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of—¶ (1) preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense, of the United States, the Commonwealths and possessions, and any areas occupied by the United States;¶ (2) supporting the national policies;¶ (3) implementing the national objectives; and¶ (4) overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States.¶ (b) There is a United States Air Force within the Department of the Air Force.¶ (c) In general, the Air Force includes aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. It is responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.¶ (d) The Air Force consists of—¶ (1) **the Regular Air Force, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air National Guard while in the service of the United States, and the Air Force Reserve;**¶ (2) all persons appointed or enlisted in, or conscripted into, the Air Force without component; and¶ (3) all Air Force units and other Air Force organizations, with their installations and supporting and auxiliary combat, training, administrative, and logistic elements; and all members of the Air Force, including those not assigned to units; necessary to form the basis for a complete and immediate mobilization for the national defense in the event of a national emergency.¶ (e) Subject to subsection (f) of this section, chapter 831 of this title, and the strength authorized by law pursuant to section 115 of this title, the authorized strength of the Air Force is 70 Regular Air Force groups and such separate Regular Air Force squadrons, reserve groups, and supporting and auxiliary regular and reserve units as required.¶ (f) There are authorized for the Air Force 24,000 serviceable aircraft or 225,000 airframe tons of serviceable aircraft, whichever the Secretary of the Air Force considers appropriate to carry out this section. **This subsection does not apply to guided missiles.**¶ (g)¶ (1) Effective October 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force shall maintain a total aircraft inventory of strategic airlift aircraft of not less than 301 aircraft. Effective on the date that is 45 days after the date on which the report under section 141(c)(3) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 is submitted to the congressional defense committees, the Secretary shall maintain a total aircraft inventory of strategic airlift aircraft of not less than 275 aircraft.¶ (2) In this subsection:¶ (A) The term “strategic airlift aircraft” means an aircraft—¶ (i) that has a cargo capacity of at least 150,000 pounds; and¶ (ii) that is capable of transporting outsized cargo an unrefueled range of at least 2,400 nautical miles.¶ (B) The term “outsized cargo” means any single item of equipment that exceeds 1,090 inches in length, 117 inches in width, or 105 inches in height.¶ (h)¶ (1) Beginning October 1, 2011, the Secretary of the Air Force may not retire more than six B–1 aircraft.¶ (2) The Secretary shall maintain in a common capability configuration not less than 36 B–1 aircraft as combat-coded aircraft.¶ (3) In this subsection, the term “combat-coded aircraft” means aircraft assigned to meet the primary.

### Violation 2NC

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### Legal precision – The War Powers Resolution applies to the phrase “introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities” – it’s a legal term of art. The legislative history and legal interpretation of the WPR is the authoritative source on what armed forces means in the context of war powers.

Chesney 8/29/13, Law Professor at UT and Senior Fellow at Brookings

Robert, “The War Powers Resolution and Using Force in Syria,” Lawfare Blog, http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/08/the-war-powers-resolution-and-using-force-in-syria/

So, any problems here? Probably not. The WPR does not define what counts as sufficient “consultation,” which pretty much ensures that arguments on that score are unlikely to go anywhere. At any rate, we are told the White House “is set to provide a briefing for bipartisan members of the Congressional leadership as well as the top ranking members of the national security committees on Thursday.” The White House surely will take the position that this is adequate to discharge any WPR consultation requirement that may apply here. Others will argue this not enough, but neither the WPR’s text nor past practice gives much basis for insisting upon broader outreach or a more different kind of outreach.¶ Of course, this only matters if you have “armed forces” introduced into existing or imminent “hostilities.” And that brings us to a second issue, one that received a lot of attention in connection with the war in Libya a few years ago (see here for a collection of Lawfare posts exploring that debate in 2011). Harold Koh famously (or infamously, depending on who you ask) argued to Congress in the summer of 2011 that U.S. involvement in Libya did not amount to involvement in hostilities, as a matter of statutory interpretation, because (i) “hostilities” is an ambiguous term the meaning of which is determined in significant part by past practice under the WPR, (ii) the meaning must be determined with reference to the specific facts of a given situation, and (iii) in the Libya example of host of limiting considerations—including the limited scope of the mission, the limited exposure of US forces to attack, the limited risk of escalation, and the limited array of combat capabilities involved—combined to keep the U.S. role under the threshold of hostilities. I assume that the administration will embrace the same position here, and if the eventual strike on Syria amounts to a barrage or two of cruise missiles and nothing more, it will seem to fit within that mold. Of course, that mold was soundly criticized at the time, and no doubt will be again…. [Note: A colleague wrote in, after reading this post, to raise the possibility that Koh might have given a different answer at an earlier stage of the operation in Libya when manned US aircraft were involved in airstrikes; re-reading Koh's testimony with that in mind, I can't foreclose the possibility, but it's not clear to me either way frankly]¶ 2. The Notification Requirement under Section 4¶ Section 4 of the WPR gives the President 48 hours to provide a written report to key Congressional leaders if US forces are put into certain triggering situations, including (i) deployment into actual or imminent hostilities, or (ii) regardless of the imminence of hostilities, the forces are deployed into foreign territory, airspace, or waters while equipped for combat (excluding supply/repair/training missions).¶ Would either be triggered by an attack? I covered the “hostilities” argument above, so let’s focus on the combat-equipped deployment test. If we are talking about manned [staffed] aircraft entering Syrian airspace, or anyone else’s airspace, in order to bomb, this one looks satisfied. If instead we are talking only about sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)—i.e., nothing in foreign territory but weaponry, as opposed to human beings—it’s a bit trickier. Perhaps one could argue that the missile itself is not “United States Armed Forces.”¶ But at any rate, this is all academic. It is inconceivable that the administration would launch an SLCM barrage or manned airstrikes without soon providing Congress with a formal notification of that fact, no doubt accompanied by language that the notification is provided “consistent with” the WPR.¶ So what really is at stake with the Notification Requirement of Section 4? Read on.¶ 3. The 60/90 day Withdrawal Clock under Section 5¶ The notification requirement sometimes matters a lot simply because it is the starting gun for the 60/90 day “clock” under WPR Section 5. But it won’t likely matter at all in this instance, for two reasons.¶ First, section 5 provides that the President must withdraw forces 60 days after the written notification under Section 4 (or after an additional 30 days if the President certifies in writing that safety requires the additional time to complete the withdrawal), unless Congress in the interim expressly authorizes the deployment. Or, rather, it says all this has to happen if the notification under Section 4 had to be filed due to satisfaction of the “hostilities” test; the clock does not start when the notification instead is triggered by the combat-ready deployment test. And so, once again, the definition of “hostilities” is the key. If one accepts the likely administration position that one-off airstrikes don’t count as WPR “hostilities,” the withdrawal clock never starts running.¶ The second reason that the withdrawal clock won’t matter is much simpler: if the attack involves a 24 or 48 hour period of airstrikes, and nothing more, the intervention will be over long before the clock can run. Only if we become entangled will this begin to matter, at which point the weight will fall on the credibility of claiming that we are not deployed into “hostilities.”

#### Topic coherence – If “armed forces” includes weapons and capabilities, then the OCO and Targeted Killing parts of the topic would be redundant with introduction of armed forces. The only predicable interpretation of the topic is one that preserves internal coherence.

#### Both branches agree

#### Congress

Eric Lorber – January 2013, EXECUTIVE WARMAKING AUTHORITY AND OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS: CAN EXISTING LEGISLATION SUCCESSFULLY CONSTRAIN PRESIDENTIAL POWER?, J.D. Candidate, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Ph.D Candidate, Duke University Department of Political Science, JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Vol. 15:3 , https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1773-lorber15upajconstl9612013

An examination of the legislative history also suggests that Congress clearly conceptualized “armed forces” as human members of the armed forces. For example, disputes over the term “armed forces” revolved around who could be considered members of the armed forces, not what constituted a member. Senator Thomas Eagleton, one of the Resolution’s architects, proposed an amendment during the process providing that the Resolution cover military officers on loan to a civilian agency (such as the Central Intelligence Agency).184 This amendment was dropped after encountering pushback,185 but the debate revolved around whether those military individuals on loan to the civilian agency were still members of the armed forces for the purposes of the WPR, suggesting that Congress considered the term to apply only to soldiers in the armed forces. Further, during the congressional hearings, the question of deployment of “armed forces” centered primarily on past U.S. deployment of troops to combat zones,186 suggesting that Congress conceptualized “armed forces” to mean U.S. combat troops.

#### The President

JULIA L. CHEN – November 2012, Boston College Law Review, NOTE: RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: ACCOMMODATING THE EVOLUTION OF WAR, 53 B.C. L. Rev 1767

Harold Koh, a legal advisor to the U.S. Department of State, explained the administration's legal position on war powers. n261 The American military activity in Libya was limited largely to providing intelligence and refueling for NATO allies. n262 The administration's view was that in cases like this when the military engages in a "limited military [\*1794] mission that involves limited exposure for U.S. troops and limited risk of serious escalation and employs limited military means," the "hostilities" are not covered by the Resolution. n263

Mr. Koh, like Senator Kerry, differentiated the action from those envisioned by the drafters of the War Powers Resolution. n264 Unlike previous administrations, the Obama administration did not challenge the constitutionality of the Resolution. n265 Rather, it argued that the Resolution was drafted to "play a particular role," and that to "play that role effectively in this century" the Resolution would require modification. n266 The Resolution regulates "the introduction of U.S. Armed Forces into hostilities." n267 As Mr. Koh explained, the Resolution does not address the situation of "unmanned uses of weapons that can deliver huge volumes of violence," such as UAVs. n268 Thus the administration claimed that there was a large hole in the Resolution for combat activities employing unmanned weaponry. n269

### 2NC Ground

#### Nuclear weapons are in an entirely different class than the conventional force in the resolution –

#### Nukes are political weapons we never plan to use – means the aff is primarily a change in political, not military flexibility – guts neg DAs about the use of force. Threats and use are entirely different.

Gurmeet Kanwal – 2005, Pakistan’s Nuclear Threshold and India’s Options,

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The use of tactical nuclear weapons can be a rational option only if it does not finally lead to irrational, more destructive levels of warfare. Gradually, but inexorably, it dawned on the military planners on both the sides of the Iron Curtain that the first use of tactical nuclear weapons was bound to lead to larger nuclear exchanges that would be uncontrollable. After protracted negotiations, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed between the US and the Soviet Union in Washington on December 8, 1987 by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. The treaty proposed the elimination of all INF missiles and practically outlawed the use of tactical and theatre nuclear weapons in Europe.5 Since then, all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from Europe. It is now universally accepted that nuclear weapons are political weapons and are no longer weapons of ‘warfighting’. By extension, ‘tactical’ or battlefield nuclear weapons now have no role to play in combat. However, since the Pakistanis appear to believe in employing nuclear weapons ‘tactically’ against ground troops, a brief look at their efficacy is merited.

### AT: Hostilities

#### This is also about hostilities, not armed forces. They are two separate requirements

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As discussed above, critical to the application of the War Powers Resolution—especially in the context of an offensive cyber operation—are the definitions of key terms, particularly “armed forces,” as the relevant provisions of the Act are only triggered if the President “introduc[es armed forces] into hostilities or into situations [of] imminent . . . hostilities,”172 or if such forces are introduced “into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.”173 The requirements may also be triggered if the United States deploys armed forces “in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.”174 As is evident, the definition of “armed forces” is crucial to deciphering whether the WPR applies in a particular circumstance to provide congressional leverage over executive actions. The definition of “hostilities,” which has garnered the majority of scholarly and political attention,175 particularly in the recent Libyan conflict,176 will be dealt with secondarily here because it only becomes important if “armed forces” exist in the situation.

### AT: Fisher

#### The WPR was not meant to apply to nuclear weapons –

#### Historical record

EUGENE V. ROSTOW - Professor of Law and Public Affairs Emeritus, Yale Law School - September, 1988, SYMPOSIUM: FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ROLES OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE COURTS: What the Constitution Means by Executive Power, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 165

There are a lot of things that the President should not report. Perhaps the most important event in President Nixon's term of office was the nuclear warning that he gave to the Soviet Union. That warning was given in order to prevent a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union against China. In the "nature of things," such supremely important actions can be effective only if they are secret. Similarly, President Johnson gave nuclear hints to the Soviet Union to keep them out of the 1967 Middle East conflict, and, of course, Truman did the same thing in Korea. Everybody who participated in the drafting of the War Powers Resolution, and all those persons testifying, agreed that the use of nuclear weapons had to be left to the sole control of the President. n169 This seems to me to give away the entire issue, and to [\*196] confirm what I said about the nature of the problem of presidential versus congressional discretion. Only the President can possibly control the use of nuclear weapons. Everyone agrees, therefore, that the President has to be allowed to use them.

#### It would make the resolutions nonsensical

Paul A. Hemesath - J.D./M.S.F.S. Georgetown University Law Center - August, 2000, NOTE: Who's Got the Button? Nuclear War Powers Uncertainty in the Post-Cold War Era, 88 Geo. L.J. 2473

Congressional opposition via the War Powers Resolution has thus far failed to provide definitive resolution because of three obstacles. First, executive decisions to engage in military strikes have generally been politically popular and the Congress has not opposed them. n53 There have been few politically safe opportunities for the legislature to challenge an executive use of force as unconstitutional, especially during the Cold War. n54 Second, the War Powers Resolution itself is an ambiguous expression of executive responsibilities. n55 Senator Biden has pointed out that the triggering mechanism for the sixty-day reporting requirement is not sufficiently defined, thus allowing the President to circumvent congressional will with ease. n56 In addition, the War Powers Resolution does not contemplate uses of force that would instantaneously place the nation at war, as would nuclear weapons. n57 Third, although some members of [\*2482] Congress seeking enforcement of the War Powers Resolution have filed lawsuits, the courts have generally refused to decide the issue. n58 Relying on a litany of jurisdictional tools in order to avoid passing final judgment--including doctrines of ripeness, political question, and standing n59 --the courts have left de facto power with the Executive to embark on foreign adventures through its direct control of the military apparatus. The root constitutional question has thus remained unanswered. n60

FOOTNOTE 57: n57 The War Powers Resolution requires a report to Congress within 48 hours of hostilities. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c). In a nuclear context, this requirement is effectively meaningless because launch and detonation can occur within a matter of hours. See CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL, NUCLEAR WEAPONS FACT BOOK 122 (1984) (estimating that Soviet nuclear submarines could destroy U.S. airbases within seven minutes of breaking the surface of the sea); FRANCIS D. WORMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 273 (1989) (stating that modern missiles can reach targets six to eight thousand miles away in 30 minutes). In addition, the Resolution's requirement for action--that the President withdraw forces after 60 days if Congress has rejected further involvement, see 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)--cannot affect nuclear usage for the same reason because nuclear war is likely to be short.

### AT: War Has Changed

#### Congress didn’t intend for the definition of “Armed Forces” to apply to all kinds of war – didn’t even encompass what they knew about in the 70s

JULIA L. CHEN – November 2012, Boston College Law Review, NOTE: RESTORING CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCE: ACCOMMODATING THE EVOLUTION OF WAR, 53 B.C. L. Rev 1767

Although there is no definition section in the War Powers Resolution or explanation of its scope, the legislative history reveals that it applies only to military personnel. n101 During the Senate debates on the Resolution, Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri attempted "to make the language of legislation match the realities of war." n102 He claimed that to those involved in war "it is irrelevant whether they are members of the Armed Forces, military advisers, civilian advisers, or hired mercenaries. The consequences are the same--they can kill, and they can be killed." n103 Thus Senator Eagleton proposed that the Resolution encompass all civilian combatants as well as "Armed Forces." n104 Senator Eagleton predicted that if his amendment was not passed, the Resolution itself would encourage broader use of CIA and other civilian personnel in future wars. n105 CIA personnel were already being "used as pilots and combat advisor[s]." n106 Thus, he foretold that not including civilian personnel in the Resolution would encourage the use of civilians, [\*1778] which was not limited by the Resolution, in the place of uniformed personnel, which was so limited. n107 Senator Eagleton's amendment was left out of the bill and never voted on by the Senate. n108 It was proposed that the Committee on Armed Services, which at the time had jurisdiction over CIA affairs, would instead consider legislation. n109 Thus, the Resolution as passed applies to the introduction of "Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances." n110

# 2NR

## CP

### AT: Radiation

**No sattelites and no radiation—micro nukes solve**

**Moore ‘2**

(Mike-, July 1,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, “Missile defenses, relabeled: those nuclear-tipped defensive ‘interceptors’ would make dandy tools for taking out the other guy's satellites”, Lexis; Jacob)

The problem was that radiation from the 1962 explosion fried the electronic circuitry of nearby satellites, which was not good. American spy satellites were becoming increasingly important as the United States tried to ferret out hard data from a closed Soviet Union.

BUT THINGS CHANGE. SCHNEIDER MAY BE THINKING OF arming tomorrow's interceptors with "micro-nukes" rather than the monster warheads of the 1960s and 1970s. The current administration, after all, seems to have an overweening passion for developing a new generation of mini- and micro-nukes with all manner of wonderfully creative uses. Meanwhile, its enthusiasm for missile defense remains as unbounded as it is unfathomable.

Combine these two enthusiasms and--voila--you might produce a workable system, particularly if you throw tens of billions of dollars at it.

After all, even true-blue believers in arms control like me have to admit that over time the Clinton-Bush missile defense people have demonstrated that they can get interceptors pretty close to incoming warheads, at least part of the time. And they will undoubtedly get better. The problem is that with a hit-to-kill system, close is not goodenough. Miss by an inch, miss by a mile; it makes no difference.

With a micro-nuke, though, a near miss could do the job. A micro-nuke ought to be able to vaporize an entire threat cloud. And because it would produce much less radiation than larger warheads, it might not indiscriminately disable satellites in orbit.